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The responses are not simply imagined: we are prescribed by Justine actually
to ﬁnd erotically attractive the ﬁctional events, to be amused by them, to
enjoy them, to admire this kind of activity. So the novel does not just present imagined events, it also presents a point of view on them, a perspective
constituted in part by actual feelings, emotions, and desires that the reader
is prescribed to have toward the merely imagined events. Given that the
notion of response covers such things as enjoyment and amusement, it is
evident that some kinds of responses are actual, and not just imagined.1
I can criticize someone for taking pleasure in others’ pain, for being amused
by sadistic cruelty, for being angry at someone when she has done no wrong,
for desiring the bad. The same is true when responses are directed at fictional events, for these responses are actual, not just imagined ones.2

We often ﬁnd ourselves deep in moral conversations about artworks in
which we willfully subject them to moral evaluation. We claim that
the endorsement of racism in Birth of a Nation is repugnant, that the
presentation of virtue as vice in Justine is deplorable, and that the
disavowal of extreme aestheticism in The Picture of Dorian Gray is
morally praiseworthy. Our tendency to subject artworks to moral evaluation raises other questions: How should we as audience members
respond to such artworks? What are the moral constraints, if any, that
limit the kinds of attitudes that we should take toward artworks?
In ‘‘The Ethical Criticism of Art,’’ Berys Gaut provides what looks
like a promising answer to these questions. Roughly, he claims that we
should not respond negatively to a morally positive scene, and vice
versa. For our purposes, such responses come under the general heading
of intentional attitudes. In virtue of being intentional, all intentional
attitudes are object directed. They are about something. In virtue of
being attitudes, they involve taking an evaluative stance, however we are
to make sense of this, toward the intentional object. Desires, emotions,
and evaluative judgments are examples of intentional attitudes. Unlike
moods, emotions are object directed. A fear is fear of something or
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other. Furthermore, fear involves taking an evaluative stance toward its
object: something is harmful and thereby is to be avoided. While moods
may be attitudinal in so far as they involve evaluation, they are not
intentional attitudes because they are not object directed.
What is interesting about Gaut’s theory of intentional attitudes is
that he claims that imaginative attitudes have the same moral constraints
as their real world analogs. What marks out an intentional attitude as
imaginative is controversial. For our purposes it is suﬃcient to think of an
imaginative attitude as an attitude whose intentional content, what the
attitude is about, is at least partially a product of the agent’s imagination.
The most obvious cases of imaginative attitudes are attitudes whose
objects do not exist at all. Let us consider fear of a particular movie
monster. Movie monsters are ﬁctional entities. As such, they lack independent existence. Properly situated audience members are fully aware of
this fact. They know that the movie monster does not really exist, that
they are engaged in an imaginative enterprise, and as a result, their fear
is imaginative. Thus, the claim is not that audiences imagine having an
attitude, but that they take an attitude toward an object or state of aﬀairs
that they imagine obtains. However, not all attitudes that are properly
called imaginative are aimed at non-existent entities. For example, we
might imagine winning a big promotion and experience joy at the thought
of so doing. Here, our joy is imaginative, because even though it is in
some sense about an existent object, ourselves, the attitude is a response
to our imagining winning the big promotion. In order for an attitude to
be imaginative, it must involve some acknowledged, imagined content
that the imaginer takes to be false. On Gaut’s view, that an intentional
attitude is imaginative is largely morally uninteresting. If he is right, then
the moral assessment of an intentional attitude will be unaﬀected by
ﬁnding out that its object is a character in a play, and not an actual
person. The evaluative stance involved in both cases will be roughly
identical. While this view is certainly appealing in many respects, it turns
out that it is not nuanced enough to accommodate the rich complexity of
our imaginative attitudes. However, thinking through Gaut’s view will
provide us an opportunity to deepen our understanding of the normativity of imaginative attitudes and provide some direction for thinking
about the proper responses to immoral art.

1. The Moral Identity Thesis
There are three features of Gaut’s analysis that are appealing to a certain
kind of moral theorist. First, it is consistent with the intuition that
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imaginative attitudes are subject to moral constraints. For example,
someone might reasonably claim that we should not be moved even
imaginatively by the call in Birth of a Nation to resist miscegenation or be
sexually excited by the tortures that befall Justine. Second, on this view,
the evaluation of imaginative attitudes is a relatively straightforward
aﬀair, or at least no less straightforward than evaluating our ordinary
work a day attitudes. We can reliably infer from the moral permissibility
or impermissibility of a non-imaginative attitude to its corollary imaginative one, and vice versa. Third, this view applies equally to all imaginative
attitudes, whether they are partially constituted by our own productive
imaginative faculty or a response to an artwork.
Gaut’s moralism about intentional attitudes then relies on the
following three claims: that non-imaginative attitudes are proper objects
of moral evaluation; that imaginative attitudes are proper objects of
moral evaluation; and that both non-imaginative and imaginative
attitudes are subject to the same, or at least relevantly similar, moral
constraints–what may be called the moral identity thesis.
Though there are some philosophers who dispute the ﬁrst claim, it
seems relatively non-problematic, and our focus will be on the second and
third claims. While Gaut is correct to claim that all imaginative attitudes
are subject to moral assessment, as it turns out, their moral assessment is
a far more nuanced aﬀair than the third claim, the moral identity thesis,
allows. In defense of the moral identity thesis, Gaut argues that imaginative attitudes are actual attitudes, and are thereby guided by the same
moral constraints as their real world analogs, what may be called the
actual attitude hypothesis. As things stand, however, it is not clear what
he means by the claim that we experience actual attitudes in imaginative
contexts. ‘‘Actual’’ may simply stand opposite to ‘‘pretend’’ or ‘‘imagined.’’ On this reading, we do not imagine that we are experiencing an
attitude; we experience a non-imagined attitude in response to an imagined scene. Yet, it is not obvious how being actual in this sense supports
the moral identity thesis. If the claim here is that imaginative attitudes
are not imagined attitudes, then this fact does not settle the normative
question at hand. On the face of it, there is no reason to think that we
would be inconsistent to hold that we actually experience emotive states, a
kind of attitude, when we engage with ﬁction, and that the emotive states
do not have the same evaluative standards as their real world analogs.
Perhaps then we should interpret ‘‘actual’’ to mean type-identical with
its real world analog. On this reading, there is a single emotional concept
of fear which allows us to correctly picks out emotional states in response
to certain states of aﬀairs, whether or not they are ﬁctional. Fear is fear is
fear. However, we have at least prima facie reason for being suspicious of
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this version of the actual attitude hypothesis. In at least some respects,
the normative structure of imaginative attitudes is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the normative structure of non-imaginative attitudes. What counts
as a reason in an imaginative case, may not count as a reason in a nonimaginative case. This is so for a couple of reasons. First, as indicated
earlier, they have diﬀerent intentional objects. Imaginative attitudes are
directed at acknowledged imaginative entities or events; non-imaginative
attitudes are directed at real entities or events. Second, they diﬀer with
respect to the kinds of responses that each legitimates.3 Running out of
the theater screaming due to fear at the presence of a vampire in Dracula
is unreasonable, while running out of the room screaming due to fear at
the presence of an actual vampire is entirely appropriate. Hence, it seems
that there is some diﬀerence in the normative structure of imaginative
attitudes and their non-imaginative counterparts.
In light of observations like these, a foe of the moral identity thesis
might oﬀer the following line of argument, which we may call the epistemic
symmetry argument: Artworks serve as invitations to entertain facts that
violate real-world epistemic constraints, and to experience emotions in
response to these facts. Moreover, we recognize that ordinary epistemic
constraints do not apply in the world of ﬁction. We are willing to accept
that a pig can talk, and even to feel moved by what she has to say. When
we accept the invitation to imagine a world that is diﬀerent from the actual
world, we do so without being called out for violating epistemic norms.
Similarly, when we are invited to imagine a ﬁctional world that violates
real-world moral constraints, and to experience a similar ﬁctional emotion, we should be able to do so without being called out for violating
moral norms. In ﬁctional contexts all normative bets are oﬀ.
Clearly, however, advocates of the epistemic symmetry argument go too
far. If they are right, then all imaginative attitudes lack a recognizable
normative structure. They are not norm governed at all. If imaginative
attitudes lack a normative structure, then there are no standards of
correctness for imaginative attitudes, neither epistemic nor moral. Yet, if
this is right, then it follows that we can never get our imaginative attitudes
wrong. But certainly anyone who reads The Little Engine that Could and
experiences horror is open to rational criticism in this regard. Horror
simply is not a ﬁtting response to this book.4 In order for horror to be a
ﬁtting response, minimally, some element of the book must be monstrous.5
2. Imaginative Attitudes and Moral Assessment
Still, someone might insist that imaginative attitudes have a normative
structure, but that the structure is fully speciﬁed by appeal to epistemic
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standards. There are no relevant moral standards for assessing imaginative attitudes.6 If we are to accept the view that imaginative attitudes
are subject to moral evaluation at all, it must be on the basis of an
independent argument. Berys Gaut provides a case that appears to help
us out. He asks us to consider what we would say about a prisoner who
consistently fantasizes about rape. He writes: ‘‘Consider a man whose
sexual life consists entirely of rape fantasies, fantasies he has not about
women he sees in real life, but women he only imagines. Would we say
that there is nothing to be said from an ethical point of view about the
attitude he manifests in his imaginings about these ﬁctional women?
Clearly, what a person imagines and how he responds to those imaginings play an important part in the ethical assessment of his character.
The mere fact that the women he imagines cannot be harmed does not
bracket his inner life from ethical assessment, since what is at issue are
the attitudes he manifests in his fantasy life. And nothing in our judgment about him requires us to assume that what is bad about his fantasies is that he may act on them—perhaps he is conﬁned to prison for
life. He stands ethically condemned for what and how he imagines,
independently of how he acts or may act.’’7 Gaut is right to claim that
there is something wrong with an individual whose sexual life consists
solely of rape fantasies. One cause for concern is a fear that such an
individual would be likely to act on his fantasies. In Gaut’s example,
however, we are asked to assume that the subject of this thought
experiment is not in a position to so act. Someone might further be
concerned about the subject of his fantasies. Having brutal sexual
fantasies about someone in particular constitutes, at the very least,
disrespect for that person. But, in Gaut’s case, we are told that the
prisoner’s imaginings always involve ﬁctional women. Yet, once we have
eliminated these reasons, there still appear to be grounds for criticizing
the prisoner; grounds that we might take to be focused exclusively on the
fact that he is given to fantasies about rape.
Still, we must be careful. Our moral criticism cannot be leveled simply
at what the prisoner is capable of imagining. We can imagine all kinds of
horriﬁc states of aﬀairs and this fact all by itself does not open us to moral
criticism. We can, for example, imagine a murder, or a robbery, or cruelty, or any number of morally depraved scenarios. The mere fact that we
can imagine such horrid scenes is no indication that there is something
morally wrong with us. In the case of the prisoner, however, the example
is not focused on the descriptive content of his imagining—that he simply
imagines a brutal rape. Instead, it appears to be focused on the kind of
attitude that he takes toward an imagined scene, in particular the evaluative stance that is involved in such an attitude. The prisoner takes his
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imagining as an object of sexual fantasy. According to Gaut, the having
of a sexual fantasy is tantamount to endorsing the content of the fantasy.
What might he mean here? One way of understanding Gaut’s analysis is
as follows: sexual fantasies are pleasurable, and pleasure is a positive
response. That the prisoner has a positive response to the content of his
imagining means that he has a certain normative commitment—that there
is something worthwhile about rape. The attitudes that the prisoner
actually holds are made evident in virtue of the imaginative attitudes that
he experiences in connection with his imagining. As a result, Gaut
maintains, the prisoner’s imaginative attitudes are open to a straightforward moral evaluation.
It is important to note that on Gaut’s view the prisoner is not
blameworthy for the imaginative element of his intentional attitude.
Instead, his claim is that the prisoner’s imaginative attitude involves at
least some non-imaginative elements including actual moral commitments. While the content of some beliefs may not be part of the normative
structure of an imaginative attitude, the content of moral beliefs are. We
do not have to actually believe that pigs can speak English, or that we are
really witnessing a brutal rape. We do have to believe that the content of
the pig’s speech is laudatory in order to be moved by it, or that there is
something worthwhile about rape in order to experience sexual pleasure.8
Since moral beliefs are subject to a straightforward moral evaluation, in
light of our imaginative attitudes we too are so subject.
Yet, there is an added level of complexity to Gaut’s account that may
bother some philosophers. We are asked to imagine that the prisoner’s
entire sexual life consists of rape fantasies, that he never sexually fantasizes about anything but rape. This additional detail certainly adds weight
to our inference that the prisoner has certain doxastic commitments. It is
hard to believe that he does not in some sense endorse rape. But we can
also imagine a prisoner who experiences rape fantasies only intermittently
or who experiences only one rape fantasy. What is the strength of our
inference from imaginative attitude to doxastic commitment then? As the
number of fantasies diminishes, so does our justiﬁcation for attributing a
particular evaluative commitment to him. But, if Gaut wants to maintain
that we are open to moral assessment for our imaginative attitudes, that
we are morally blame worthy for any putatively immoral imaginative
attitude, and that our blameworthiness in such cases stems from the
repugnant evaluative commitments underlying this attitude, then he must
convince us that an individual who fantasizes about rape only once
exposes a morally repugnant evaluative commitment.
Some philosophers might also be concerned that the content of the
prisoner’s attitude is a sexual fantasy. Someone might contend that the
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pleasure involved in sexual fantasies is a unique kind of pleasure in that it
is distinctly non-evaluative, as in just about any sexual fantasy that
involves role-playing. It seems reasonable to think that an individual
might be sexually aroused by playing a role, while explicitly rejecting such
a role outside of the sphere of the safety of the fantasy. If this is right,
then what sexual fantasies we are given to may not provide reliable
grounds to infer who we are, or what our commitments are, and arguing
from a case of sexual fantasy to the morality of imaginative attitudes in
general may be dubious.
Instead of trying to argue that sexual pleasure is evaluative, it might be
best to eliminate this concern by considering a similar single imaginative
attitude that does not involve a sexual fantasy. Let us consider, for
example, an individual who imagines beating women in general for no
other reason than it gives him a feeling of satisfaction. Most of us would
agree that this kind of response is at least indicative of a moral failing, if
not a moral failing itself. There must be something wrong with someone
who takes pleasure in his imaginative entertaining of the beating of
women. It is hard, if not impossible, to even imagine that such an individual does not hold the corollary immoral commitment. In a case like
this, and perhaps also in the case of the rape fantasy, it is reasonable to
hold that an individual’s imaginative attitudes are expressive of his or her
real moral commitments.
Assuming that we ﬁnd either of these cases compelling, we are committed to the claim that some imaginative attitudes fare poorly from the
moral point of view. If this is right, then the second claim of Gaut’s
moralism about imaginative attitudes has been established: imaginative
attitudes are subject to moral assessment. However, we should be clear
that on this analysis our moral assessment of an imaginative attitude is
not aimed at its imaginative intentional content per se. Instead, the claim
is that an individual who can experience this kind of response must also
have immoral commitments. Anyone who did not would be incapable of
such a response. If this is right, then the moral evaluation of imaginative
attitudes is parasitic on the evaluation of our actual moral beliefs or
attitudes, depending on how doxastic you want to be here. While it seems
likely that anyone except the most hardened of amoralists will be persuaded to concede this claim, someone who advanced Gaut’s moralism
would want us to accept the view that all of our imaginative attitudes
presuppose such evaluative commitments. This is a substantive claim that
cannot be adequately supported by the argument thus far. If we are to be
convinced by this version of the moral identity thesis, that imaginative
attitudes presuppose the same moral commitments as their real world
analogs and in light of this are subject to similar moral assessment, then it
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must be on the basis of an independent argument. Such an argument has
yet to be produced.

3. Monstrous Thoughts
In absence of a compelling argument in favor of the moral identity thesis,
let us consider the following four cases. In so considering let us ask
ourselves the following two questions: Would the mere fact that we
experience the imaginative attitude described imply that we have the kind
of moral commitments insisted upon by an advocate of Gaut’s moralism?
Would it even make it likely that we have such commitments?
Here is the ﬁrst case: with an important deadline approaching, Jane’s
sour boss has been riding her particularly hard. The fact that he is doing
so has caused her some stress, but she knows in the end his pushing her is
causing her to produce good work. One evening, feeling frustrated, she
fantasizes about punching him in the nose. While she actually respects
him, and in a cool hour is adamant that she does not wish him harm, she
nevertheless ﬁnds the thought of her pugilist self amusing.
Here is the second case: Kurt has just ﬁnished watching the latest
South Korean monster movie Gwoemul, also known as, The Host. After
the movie, he returns to his home and ﬁnds himself thinking about the
details of the creature’s physical manifestation. He considers the acrobatic
elegance with which it performed its terrible rampage on the citizens of
Seoul. He begins to imagine himself as a similar sort of creature, gliding
out of the Han River and terrorizing the population. He enjoys and is
even amused by the thought of his terrible rampage.
Here is the third case: Linda is playing a video game called Thief. The
object of the game is to use skills of stealth in order to steal as much loot
as possible without getting killed. In the game she often encounters
ﬁctional characters that could thwart her thievery, alert the authorities to
her presence, or even kill her character. In order to get around the
ﬁctional characters, it is often best to knock them out with a blow to the
back of the head, though in very tight corners she has to kill them. When
she gets past an individual in the game in any of these ways, given that she
has sized up the situation appropriately and used only the necessary
amount of force, she is thrilled. Moreover, when one of the pesky
do-gooders in the game intervenes in her wicked plans, making her gamelife more diﬃcult, she gets annoyed.
Here is the fourth case: Mike is an actor charged with playing the part
of Gloucester. Part of his acting method is to become the character. He
dedicates a great deal of eﬀort to understanding Gloucester. He identiﬁes

MONSTROUS THOUGHTS AND THE MORAL IDENTITY THESIS

195

his goals and aims, his normative commitments, and the kinds of experiences that could have operated to shape his particular character. On the
basis of his study, he tries to predict what it must feel like, from the inside,
to be him. Eventually his study, coupled with additional training in
method acting, puts him in a position to imaginatively take on his
thoughts and feelings, so that on stage he ﬁnds himself proud of his
ﬁctional cruelties.
In each of the four cases, were the object of the attitude actual, then
the attitude would fare poorly from the moral point of view. Moreover,
the moral assessment of the relevant attitude, not to mention the relevant
action, would be suﬃciently weighty to render it generally impermissible.
Enjoying either punching someone’s lights out, or terrorizing individuals
is a sign of a deeply ﬂawed character, as is being thrilled at knocking
someone out with a good blow to the back of the head, or taking pride in
wanton cruelty. But, if Gaut’s analysis is correct, then these imaginative
attitudes are morally problematic because they presuppose a certain
moral commitment. How plausible is such a claim? While many of us can
imagine ourselves experiencing at least one, if not all, of the imaginative
attitudes described in the above four cases, it is doubtful that we would
see this as a reason to worry about our character. Let us consider, for
example, Linda’s annoyance at the pesky do-gooder in Thief. Playing the
game requires imaginatively taking on the role of a thief. The player
literally sees the world from the thief’s vantage point, and exercises the
theif’s skills. Furthermore, it requires her, in some measure, to imaginatively identify with the thief’s character. In order to play the game, she
must imaginatively share the character’s end of theft. Still, there are limits
to this kind of character identiﬁcation. Despite the fact that a player is
generally immersed in any game world worth its salt, game play cannot be
completely divorced from her actual character. For example, some
players may be bothered more by resorting to blackjacking, as opposed to
sneaking, because they value the game skills involved with sneaking. In
tighter corners, it is more diﬃcult. Moreover, that she can identify with
characters at all when it comes to video games probably says a bit about
the kind of person she is. Still, there is a real sense in which many of the
imaginative attitudes that players experience do not implicate their moral
character in the way that Gaut insists. That Linda enjoys playing Thief is
no indication that she would be tempted to actually steal from others for
the thrill of it. Even if we were to do so, she would not need to infer that
we would experience thrill and not the appropriate sense of shame and
guilt at our actual theft. More telling, however, is that intentional attitudes like shame and guilt are not only missing from game speciﬁc
emotional repertoire, but that in this case it seems they should be. Shame
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and guilt at the imaginative theft seem ill placed in the context of playing
Thief. After all, nothing is ever actually stolen. Players know that they are
playing a game, and that doing so need not involve their actual moral
commitments. They know that they are only imaginatively identifying
with a thief, a fact that grants them a temporary, albeit limited, release
from ordinary moral evaluation. This may even be part of the fun
involved. While enjoying actually giving someone a good blow to the
head, or worse yet, enjoying plotting the demise of our own family is
morally repugnant, doing so in the context of playing Thief or playing the
part of Gloucester is morally innocuous.
What these four cases show is not only that our imaginative attitudes
can be isolated from our actual moral commitments, but that they often
are so isolated. The claim is not that all of our moral commitments are
fully isolatable. Imaginative attitudes may require some degree of consistency with our moral commitments. Furthermore, some imaginative
attitudes may require a substantial degree of evaluative consistency. The
rape and beating fantasies support this claim. Moreover, in the four cases,
we can imagine some agents whose imaginative attitudes are reﬂective of
their actual moral commitments. For example, we can expect there to be a
very real diﬀerence between the joy and annoyance that we might experience while playing Thief and the joy and annoyance that a committed
sadist or immoralist would experience. A committed sadist might well
endorse the attitude she takes toward Thief as the correct moral attitude
to take toward cruelties, both ﬁctional and actual. While the sadist’s
imaginative attitude would expose a ﬂaw in her character, in other nonsadistic agents it might not. What is being denied is that our imaginative
attitudes by themselves provide a reliable inference to the kinds of moral
commitments identiﬁed by Gaut.

4. The Evaluative Asymmetry Argument
In response, Gaut might simply deny that the four cases are convincing,
and insist that in each the individuals expose a ﬂaw in their characters.
However, taking line this of argument is not attractive for a couple of
reasons. First, it would commit us to a radical revision of our ordinary
moral practices. While only four cases have been outlined here, there are
numerous others that could be constructed, cases that raise similar doubts
about the inference from imaginative attitude to moral commitment.
Denying the legitimacy of such an inference, does not entail the truth of
amoralism about imaginative attitudes. We can conceive of cases where
the inference is compelling. Enjoying the thought of beating women is one
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such case. The point is that the inference does not hold in many cases, and
this suggests that the moral identity thesis is not nuanced enough to
accommodate our moral intuitions in a wide range of cases.
Second, taking this line of argument would put Gaut’s own argumentative strategy in jeopardy. In order to support his conclusion that
imaginative attitudes are legitimately subject to moral criticism, Gaut
relies on our moral intuitions about a particular case, the rape fantasy.
But, if our intuitions are supposed to be unreliable in the four structurally
similar cases, then it seems that we should see them as similarly unreliable
in the rape fantasy case. It will not do to rely on our intuitions when they
suit our argumentative purposes only to deny them when they do not.
Still, Gaut might argue that the four cases are problematic, because
they involve an unexpressed evaluative component that is missing from
their non-imaginative counterparts, which may be called the evaluative
asymmetry argument. Moreover, Gaut might continue, it is the asymmetry that is responsible for our judgment that each of the four cases is
morally permissible, though their non-imaginative counterpart would not
be. In each of these four cases, prima facie moral reasons count against
the imaginative attitude involved, but are out-weighed by competing nonmoral reasons, the evaluative asymmetry. In considering how the asymmetry argument might be applied to the four cases, Gaut might begin by
reminding us that enjoying plotting the demise of our own family is
morally repugnant, though doing so in the course of playing Gloucester is
not. Moreover, he might continue, this diﬀerence in judgment is due to
artistic considerations that are present in the imaginative case, but absent
in the non-imaginative one. In this case the prima facie immorality of the
imaginative attitude is outweighed by the artistic merit of the performance, which explains our intuition that it is generally permissible for the
actor to experience the imaginative attitude that he does. Even stronger,
he might point out, when we eliminate the artistic elements from the case
at hand, the wrongness of the imaginative attitude comes to the fore. We
should not enjoy even the thought of harm coming to our family, and
anyone who engages in these kinds of imaginative attitudes must be
morally ﬂawed.
Though this line of defense is prima facie plausible in the Gloucester
case, it appears less so in the other three cases. In these cases, it is not
obvious what the extra evaluative considerations would be. Moreover,
even if we could be convinced that there is a similar asymmetry involved
in all four cases, they still raise a serious concern for Gaut’s account of the
immorality of imaginative attitudes. Since Gaut insists that our imaginative attitudes imply a consistency of moral commitment, the subjects in
the cases must actually endorse monstrous rampages, a boss having his
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lights punched out, blackjacking individuals for proﬁt, or the destruction
of the person’s family. But, the four cases raise doubts about this claim,
an evaluative asymmetry notwithstanding. In order for the evaluative
asymmetry argument to be credible, we need a more plausible account of
the immorality involved in each case than the one provided by Gaut.
Perhaps a moral identity theorist of a diﬀerent stripe might concede
that our imaginative attitudes can depart from our actual attitudes and
commitments, but insist that in fact they should not do so: all of our
attitudes ought to reﬂect sound moral commitments. On this understanding of the moral identity thesis, it would be morally better if we did
not experience such fantasy attitudes, even when they are not expressive
of our actual moral commitments. While such a solution avoids the
unconvincing claim that imaginative attitudes generally reﬂect our actual
moral commitments, it is not clear why we should accept this solution. It
is far from obvious what kinds of moral considerations we would point to
in the case of Gloucester. How would the actor be morally better oﬀ for
lacking this kind of moral slippage? It seems to make more sense to
simply admit that morality does not require us to speak poorly of the
actor’s imaginative attitude at all. The same analysis can be applied to the
other three cases.

5. Toward a Moral Theory of the Imaginative Emotions
Any adequate theory of the normativity of imaginative attitudes will have
to allow us to accommodate the four considerations that have come to the
fore in light of our discussion of the moral identity thesis. First, it is not
reasonable to demand that an adequate theory will allow us to determine
in advance what the moral status of any given imaginative attitude will be.
We will have to admit that these kinds of attitudes are highly context
dependent, and determining their moral status will require paying close
attention to the particular details of the case at hand. For example, in the
case of Gloucester it seems right to point out that the artistic context
informs our moral judgment. However, we certainly should not infer from
this particular case to the general principle that all imaginative attitudes
are morally permissible when in service of any artwork whatsoever.
Second, in some cases, moral considerations form part of the normative
structure of an imaginative attitude per se. In these kinds of cases, the
moral evaluation of the imaginative attitude is not parasitic on determining if the agent actually holds the moral commitment involved. For
example, it seems plausible to insist that we should not enjoy thinking
about the demise of our family members. Similarly, we should not be
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angered by the thought of our family doing well. It will not help to insist
that we do not really wish our family harm. Since a sound moral agent
would not entertain such outlooks even imaginatively, moral reasons can
form part of the normative structure of the imaginative attitude per se.
Third, in cases where moral considerations do not form part of the
normative structure of the imaginative attitude per se, there may still be
sense to be made of the claim that an agent is open to criticism in light of
such an attitude. In some cases, making a sound moral evaluation about
an imaginative attitude will require making a determination about its
relationship to the agent’s actual moral commitments. While Linda’s
annoyance at the pesky do-gooders in the video game Thief is morally
innocuous, there are some cases where it may be morally problematic.
For example, the annoyance experienced by a committed sadist will be
subject to moral condemnation, assuming that his annoyance is a
reﬂection of his actual moral commitments.
The fourth consideration has not been addressed explicitly here,
though it has been operating to inform our judgments on all the cases.
Sometimes, moral considerations form part of the normative structure of
an imaginative attitude, but they do so only contingently. For example, in
the actual moral world in which we currently live there are certain moral
problems that are of paramount moral importance. A moral problem will
be of paramount moral importance when it is pervasive and involves
substantial violations of justice. Serious issues of oppression are likely
candidates here. In such contexts, a competent moral agent will be much
more resistant to taking up the kinds of imaginative attitudes that appear
to endorse such moral violations. That the eradication of the oppression
of women is an urgent moral priority in our particular society gives us a
reason to avoid experiencing joy at the thought of beating women qua
women. Generally, such thoughts are not enjoyable. While considerations
of what is of paramount moral importance have the virtue of allowing us
to accommodate our judgments in some special cases, like the case of the
rape and beating fantasies considered earlier, they further help to explain
our diﬀering intuitions in the imaginative case of punching out a boss’s
lights. The protection of the interests of bosses is not an urgent moral
priority for us, while the protection of the interests of women qua women
is. A diﬀerence in contingent moral considerations may make a diﬀerence
in our moral judgment. Other concerns that are of paramount moral
importance are likely to be racism and homophobia. This serves to
explain why we should not be emotionally moved by the call in Birth of a
Nation to resist miscegenation. Part of why competent moral agents are
resistant to imaginatively take on these kinds of attitudes is that they
stand in stark contrast to the urgent moral priorities that we face.
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If this is right, then sometimes moral reasons ﬁgure non-consequentially in the justiﬁcation of an imaginative attitude, but do so only
contingently. They do so contingently because what is of paramount
moral importance will be diﬀerent not only at diﬀerent times, but also in
diﬀerent social and political contexts. It may be illustrative here to think
of the shifting moral norms involved in ethnic jokes. Finding certain
ethnic jokes funny, say a joke about the Irish, may be morally problematic and a fairly reliable indicator of our character, if we are in
London in the 1980s. However, in the context of the United States today,
where we no longer take the eradication of negative attitudes toward the
Irish to be an issue of paramount moral concern, ﬁnding the same ethnic
joke funny may not be morally problematic. The same joke then may be
unfunny in certain contexts and yet funny in other contexts. This is not to
suggest that anything goes with regard to Irish jokes. There may be some
jokes whose oﬀensiveness renders the joke unfunny. The claim is that
there has been a loosening of the moral constraints on some ethnic jokes,
and that there may be good moral reason for this loosening. Like ethnic
jokes, the moral structure of imaginative attitudes is partially contingent
on moral facts on the ground.
While the moral assessment of imaginative attitudes is quite complicated, possibly complicated enough to resist any complete explication,
deepening our understanding of their normative structure brings theoretic
rewards. With a more adequate theory of the imaginative attitudes we are
able to say with greater accuracy when we should feel bad about not only
our work a day imaginative attitudes, but also when we should feel bad
about feeling good about immoral art.9
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